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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Expansi6n of "Public Interest" Standing
The Federal Administrative agencies, regarded by New Dealers
as the most effective political instrument for social and economic
reform, have long since lost their progressive aura. The quest for
revitalization has been carried on in the legislature and the law
reviews for a generation.' Meanwhile, the federal judiciary has
steadily widened public access to these centers of power. Judges
have expanded the procedural law of "standing to sue" to urge upon
the agencies broader value considerations and an affirmative burden
of inquiry ever since the Supreme Court decided the "watershed
case," 2 FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station.3 Development of
standing is particularly evident in court review of Federal Power
Commission and Federal Communications Commission proceedings, 4 for these agencies have been the most criticized by courts and
commentators.5 Two recent cases,6 setting aside FPC and FCC
orders, have significantly broadened the right of standing. In remanding the records, the Courts of Appeals for the District of
Columbia and Second Circuit made explicit the relationship between
the public's right to participate in and appeal from agency action
and the agencies' duty to plan in the public interest.
When it established a number of new agencies during the Depression, Congress typically provided that persons "aggrieved" by
administrative action could initiate review by the courts.' In the
'See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB. 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Jaffe,
The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67
HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1954); BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955); Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, 60 CoLUm. L. REv. 429 (1960).
'JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcrioN 503 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as JAFFE].

'FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
' JAFFE 517.

'See Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for a
Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REv. 863, 1055 (1962).
'Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Office of Communications of
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
'E.g., Securities and Exchange Act § 9 (a), 48 Stat. 80 (1933), as
amended 15 U.S.C. § 77i (1964); Federal Communications Act § 402(b)
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absence of such statutes, the Supreme Court had not granted standing to parties who had not suffered a "legal wrong." This meant in
practice that the petitioner was required to be a member of the class
whose "interests" were protected by the challenged agency. For instance, in the Chicago Junction Case,' a railroad was allowed to
challenge an Interstate Commerce Commission order allowing a competing railroad to control a station used by both. But in L. Singer
& Sons v. Union Pacific Ry. Co.,' non-members of the transportation industry had no standing to complain of ICC action permitting
an extension of trackage that favored their competitor.
The Supreme Court did not follow the traditional theory of
standing when faced with a suit brought under a "person aggrieved" statute. In FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station' it held
that petitioner had no right to complain that it would suffer severe
economic injury if the FCC licensed a competitor, because the act
was not designed to protect existing licensees." Yet petitioner did
have standing to sue, since it was definitely "aggrieved" by the
licensing order. 2 It could raise issues of law, and attempt to prove
that the license grant was not in the "public interest." This was
what Congress had intended by the review provision; if not, then
such actions would be unreviewable and the section would be mean13
ingless.
The distinction thus drawn between the basis for standing and
the issues presentable on appeal greatly increased the opportunity
for review. Since access to the courts now depended only on allegation of some adverse effect suffered, judicial review would no longer
be a province wholly occupied by members of the regulated industry. The concept of "interest" was now poured into a new mold:
(6), 48 Stat. 926 (1934, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (6) (1964); Federal Power Act
§ 313 (b), 49 Stat. 860 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 825(1)(b) (1964); Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 701 (f) 52 Stat. 1055 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 371 (f)
(1964) ("adversely affected"); Administrative procedure Act § 10(a), 60
Stat. 237 (1964), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1964).
8The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1964).
'L. Singer and Sons v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 311 U.S. 295 (1940). The
Court said petitioners must show a greater interest than "a common concern for obedience to law," id. at 302. Review was allowed to a "party
in interest" under the Transportation Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C.
§ 1(20) (1964).
10309 U.S. 470 (1940).
'lId.
475.
'2 Id. at
at 477.
13

Ibid.
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Since "public interest" was
that of "private Attorney General."
to be the focus of the reviewing court's attention, the judges were
encouraged to urge the agencies away from "industry orientation"
and toward "consumer orientation."'I5
In developing the theory of standing suggested in Sanders, the
federal courts decided that aggrievement need not be financial, and
allowed consumers as well as competitors to assert their view of the
"public interest." The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, for example, thought that radio station KOA was aggrieved by
a license grant to another station, which would interfere with KOA's
signal. The Supreme Court affirmed, FCC v. NBC (KOA), 8 on
the narrower ground that KOA's license had been modified by the
order, so it was a member of a class given a specific right of review
by the statute." The FCC took advantage of this holding by arguing until recently that only those showing personal economic injury
or electronic interference could appeal its orders. But the broad
interpretation of "aggrieved" proposed in the court of appeals' opinion' s was reasserted by the same court in Office of Communications
of United Church of Christ v. FCC.19 The implications that circuit
had seen in Sanders in 1942 were fully realized in 1966, when it
held that the FCC must allow "audience participation" in licensing
proceedings.20
An opinion by Judge Frank of the second circuit was important
and influential in the process. Associated Industries v. Ickes"' held
that a consumer's group threatened with financial loss by an order
raising the fixed price of coal could challenge the order in court.
"' judge Frank's term in Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2nd
Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
"=See Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (D.C. Cir. 1966); for a theory of "industry orientation" in federal regulation agencies, see JArFE 10-16.
10319 U.S. 239 (1943), affirming 132 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
"T FCC v. NBC (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
8
It stated that non-economic injury was recognized by the term "aggrieved," since otherwise non-profit radio stations could not appeal. NBC v.
FCC, 132 F.2d 545, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1942). This court subsequently allowed
users of a mass transit system to protest an agency action allowing use of
radio broadcasts on buses, and the Supreme Court apparently agreed on the
standing question. Pollak v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450 (D.C.
Cir. 1951), rev/d on other grounds, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
10 359 F.2d 994, 1001 (1966).
20Id. at 1005.
" Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as
vtoot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
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In his opinion Judge Frank pointed out the revolutionary effect of
Sanders' statement that Congress had conferred standing on parties
who could not otherwise be heard. He dealt at length with the "case
or controversy" requirement of the federal constitution.2 2 The required controversy existed, he said, when a public officer's action
was attacked as a violation of his statutory powers. Since the
Attorney General had always had constitutional authority to sue the
officer, the problem was not whether a case existed, but rather who
could bring it to court. Massachusetts v. Mello. 2 3 disallowed federal
taxpayer suits, so a private citizen could not sue a governmental
officer on his own. Congress had the power to confer on him the
standing of a "private Attorney General,"' however, and this is the
meaning of the "persons aggrieved" statutes. Apparently this doctrine has been accepted by the Supreme Court, for the constitutional
objections to a liberal standing policy voiced in some early cases
have not been heard since.2 5
Though we may regard the constitutional question as settled,
the policy questions are not. If Congress has the power to grant
standing to members of the public, how far has it exercised this
power? And is there any basis outside the review statutes on which
the right to standing may rest? The Supreme Court cited Associated Industries with approval in granting standing to a shareholder of a corporation affected by an SEC order.2 6 In two later cases,
it again found standing despite the speculative or minimal nature of
the injury.2" But the lack of a consistent theory was evident in one
case that it heard without telling why. When the Secretary of the
Interior and several electric cooperatives challenged an FPC order
licensing a private power dam on the Roanoke River, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, said:
"U.S. Cow¢sT. Art. III, § 2.
23262 U.S. 447 (1923).
"Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). "Itis
within the power of Congress to confer such standing to prosecute an appeal." FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940).
2" Compare Justice Douglas' dissents in FCC v. NBC (KOA), 319 U.S.
239, 265 (1943), and United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153,
175 "0(1953).
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 325 U.S. 385 (1945).
-'Parker v. Fleming, 329 U.S. 531 (1947) (tenant's protest against eviction of Office of Price Administration); Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (State required to fire employee or lose certain
highway funds allowed to challenge Hatch Act).
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We hold that the petitioners have standing. Differences of view,
however, preclude a single opinion of the Court as to both petitioners. It would not further clarification of this complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any
event more or less determined by the specific circumstances of
individual situations, to set out the divergent grounds in support
of standing in these cases.28
Consumer standing has been approved often, in recent years,
where petitioners challenged rate fixing or natural gas licensing by
the FPC.2' The interest in these cases is usually economic, but sometimes not. 0 Members of the regulated group have been able to
assert non-economic injury to gain standing before the FCC."' An
important step was taken when a competitor who was not a broadcaster was allowed to protest the manner in which a license was
used. 2 However, there had been no consumer standing before the
FCC prior to 1966. And although the FPC had been challenged by
conservation groups before, 3 their right to standing had not been
"8UnitedStates ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
Congress had adopted a plan for development of the Roanoke River Basin.
The Secretary of the Interior, who would have control over allocation of
excess power produced by a Government dam, and the cooperatives, who
were interested in purchasing cheap power, argued that the plan did not
permit private operations within its territory. The lower court had denied
standing, United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 191 F.2d 796 (4th Cir.
1951).
"' California v. FPC, 353 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965); City of Pittsburgh
v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of
America v. FPC, 253 F.2d 3 (3rd Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927
(1958) (gas company which passed on rate increases to customers represented their interests as a matter of ethics and good business). "Essentially, the petitioners represent the ultimate consumers of the ,gas." Public
Serv. Comm'n. v. FPC, 257 F.2d 717, 720 (3rd Cir. 1958), aff'd sub nom.
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
"oLynchburg Gas Co. v. FPC, 336 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (under
new rates petitioners would have to change suppliers).
"Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 278 (2d
Cir. 1965) (holder of citizen's license could challenge FCC regulation prohibiting use of license for hobby).
"2Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 946 (1959) (unfair advertising).
"'National Hells Canyon Ass'n. v. FPC, 237 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957); Washington Dep't. of Game v. FPC, 207
F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954). The right of
associations to represent their members has long been recognized, and was
specifically approved in National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963)) (per curiam).
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made explicit or effective until Scenic Hudson PreservationConference v.FPC.s4
One month before deciding United Church of Christ, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals heard a musicians' organization
claim standing to represent the public's interest in live music programs, and to represent musicians aggrieved by a radio station's
failure to present a promised amount of such programming. 5
Though the issue was "well briefed! and presented "interesting and
intriguing questions,""6 it was not decided. The court may have
thought United Church of Christ presented a more clear-cut case
for audience standing. Petitioners were religious and civil-rights
groups claiming that television station WLBT in Jackson, Mississippi, unfairly discriminated against Negroes and Catholics in its
programs, and carried excessive commercials. The FCC had heard
complaints about WLBT before 37 but had continued to renew the
station's license, an action in keeping with the agency's traditional
reluctance to criticize program content.38 Faced with these circumstances, the court found that a grant of standing was "essential to
insure that the holders of broadcasting licenses be responsive to the
needs of the audience ....,,31 It said "the concept of standing is a

practical and functional one,"4 ° and has not remained static.
Similarly, in Scenic Hudson the court criticized the FPC's
"narrow view" of standing.4" That case involved Consolidated Edison's application to build a hydroelectric plant at Storm King Moun" 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). The FPC argued that parties must show

"personal economic injury resulting from the Commission's action" in order
to obtain review. Id. at 615.
" American Federation of Musicians v. FCC, 356 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir.

1966).

Id. at 830. The case was decided on other grounds.
3'Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; Note, 77 HARv. L. REv. 701, 710 (1964).
" Note, 77 HARV. L. REv. 701 (1964); Note, 68 YALE L.J. 783 (1959).
Private-TV, because it receives huge public grants from the nation
in the form of licenses, should have a large dedication to the public
service. But it has never paid more than lip service to the concept
and the Federal Communications Commission has never made any
sustained effort to force a shift in programming-for various reasons,
the most important being the influence of the TV lobby in Congress.
Markel, A Program for Public-TV, N.Y. Times, March 12, 1967, § 6
(Magazine), Part 1, 25, 126.
39359 F.2d at 1002.
,oIbid.
1 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 615
(1965).
'o
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tain in New York, "an area of unique beauty and historical significance." The complaining petitioners were an association composed
of several non-profit conservation groups, and three municipalities
in the area. They charged that the Commission had failed to give
adequate consideration to non-economic values in its proceedings.
The court discussed the congressional mandate for agency fostering of these interests, and said:
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational,
and recreational aspects of power development, those who by
their activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in
such areas, must be held to be "aggrieved" parties .... 42
Both courts rejected the objections that the Commissions could
adequately represent the public interest, and that a broadening of
standing would encourage participation by so many parties that proceedings would be unworkable.4" The District of Columbia court
thought that FCC representation of the listener's interest was "no
longer a valid assumption."4 4 And, the second circuit dismissed the
FPC's fear that "literally thousands" would intervene and appeal by
saying, "Our experience with public actions confirms the view that
the expense and vexation of legal proceedings is not lightly undertaken."' 45 The courts suggested that formation of groups represent-

"1Id. at 616. Petitioners were said to have some economic interest, in
addition, but this was not seen as an important factor. Ibid.
"'The courts have decided that the right of intervention should be tested
by the same standards applied to the right of appeal, so the benefits extended by the instant cases can be taken advantage of by those seeking to
participate in agency proceedings. See, e.g., American Communications
Ass'n v. United States, 298 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962); Public Serv. Comm'n
v. FPC, 284 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1960); National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191
F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951). But cf. Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
NLRB, 339 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1964); contra, Marine Engineers' Beneficial
Ass'n v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953).
Professor Davis thinks there should be a distinction between rules governing intervention and those controlling standing to appeal. DAvis, ADniNisTRATiVE LAW TREATISE §§ 8.11, 22.08 (1964).
The primary reason for
limiting intervention is the fear that some parties seek only to delay the
proceedings; but this objection would seem less forceful where the parties
will not reap financial gain from delay.
" 359 F.2d at 1003. See 354 F.2d at 620. Cf. UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S.
205 (1965); NLRB v. Local 2, United Ass'n of Journeymen, 360 F.2d 428
(2d Cir. 1966). These cases held that parties who brought or defended
charges before the NLRB could intervene to assert their interest in court
review of action taken by the Board.
" 354 F.2d at 617. The same language is found in JA-FFE at 523. It has
been said that the cost of taking a case of average complexity "adequately"
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ing common interests would limit the number of participants."
The courts clearly indicated in these two cases that their extension of standing was meant to provide effective participation by
representatives of non-economic public interests. They criticized the
agencies for not realizing the duty to affirmatively pursue the good
of the public as a whole, rather than that of the regulated industry,
and to carefully consider alternative proposals put forth by the
parties.4 The federal judiciary has not always been so forceful in
encouraging agency planning. In early cases it was assumed that
administrative bodies were vigorously reformist, and the courts left
procedure to the agencies' discretion so long as private rights were
given some protection.4" With the passage of the Administrative
Procedure Act,4" however, Congress urged the courts to be more
critical in examining agency action."0 The courts continue to approve agency planning and exercise of administrative discretion
when directed toward broad policies." But they are more eager to
remand records for further consideration where the agency has not
adequately studied alternative proposals that appear prima facie to
have merit." If the parties do not present alternatives, the agencies
to the courts is "upwards of $5000." Gardner, The Administrative Process,
in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND Tomoow 108, 140 (Paulsen ed. 1959).
F.2d at 1005; 354 F.2d at 617.
"359
6
" The Second Circuit said that the FPC's "role does not permit it to
act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing
before it.. ." 354 F.2d at 620. See 359 F.2d at 1008.
See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); NBC
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591 (1944).
4860 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1964).
See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).
"1 See Namekagen Hydro Co. v. FPC, 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954)
(approving denial of license to build dam on river with special recreational
qualities); FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961)
(approving consideration of end-use of gas and conservation of resources) ;
Goodwill Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 325 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (FCC
within power in modifying "clear channel" stations after expiration of
license term); FPC v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90 (1965) (FPC has
jurisdiction over dams in non-navigable streams, under Commerce power).
This last case appears to adopt the view of Justice Jackson, whose dissent
in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 628 (1944), urged more
comprehensive planning in rate-fixing cases, including a consideration of
conservation policies.
2Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
(Frank, J.), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom. Rederi v. Isbrandtsen
Co., 342 U.S. 950 (1952); City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 913 (1960).
48

50
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are expected to seek them." In the instant cases, the courts further
extended this liberal review policy. Alternatives to the hydroelectric
plant on Storm King were discussed at some length by the second
circuit, 4 which found that they had such merit that the FPC exhibited a "disregard of the statute" by not receiving them. 5 And
the court in United Church of Christ mentioned several advantages
to be found in refusing to license WLBT at all.5 6 By devoting such
attention to alternatives, the courts stressed that the public interest
requires affirmative planning rather than passive acceptance of the
7
regulated industry's point of view.
As Professor Jaffe has pointed out, "the law of standing raises
acute questions concerning the role of judicial review, or, more
broadly, judicial control of public officers." ' Jaffe and other critics
agree that agency practice badly needs changing. They point to
"industry orientation," lack of political responsibility, failure to
define policies, and stagnation in case-by-case nearsightedness.59
However, they differ on the function of the courts in bringing
about reform;" and the judges have not developed a consistent
"See Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 289 F.2d 754, 755 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1960); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354
F.2d 608, 620 (1965); Office of Communications of United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1009 (1966).
"354 F.2d at 618-24.
Id.

'

at 620.

359 F.2d at 1009.
"In these circumstances a pious hope on the Commission's part for

better things from WLBT is not a substitute for evidence and findings."
359 F.2d at 1008. "The Commission's reviewed proceedings must include as
a basic concern the preservation of natural beauty and of national historical
shrines, keeping in mind that, in our affluent society, the cost of a project
is only one of several factors to be considered." 354 F.2d at 624. Compare
Public Serv. Comm'n. v. FPC, 257 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1958), aff'd sub nor.
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959). In that
case the FPC had twice refused to grant a license to an oil producer at an
unusually high rate; when the producer threatened to keep the oil out of
the interstate market, the FPC capitulated. The court reversed, since there
was 8no evidence that the high rate was in the public interest.
JAFFE 459.
" See, e.g., BERNSTEIN,

REGULATING BusINESS

BY INDEPENDENT

CoM-

MIssIoN 291-95 (1955)

[hereinafter cited as BERNSTEIN]; JAFFE 10-25;
Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
FRIENDLY]; Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227
(1966) [hereinafter cited as REIcH]; Shapiro, The Supreme Court and
Government Planning: Judicial Review and Policy Formulation, 35 GEO.
L. REV. 329 (1966) [hereinafter cited as SHAPIRO].
" Bernstein, Friendly and Shapiro counsel judicial restraint. BERNSTEIN

WASH.
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theory either.61 The courts have been content to rely on the vague
language of the review statutes in overcoming agency opposition to
broader standing."s In the instant cases, though, are found the most
explicit statements yet of the substantive reasons for procedural development: to make the agencies more responsive to the needs of
the people." This underlying policy would seem inherent in the
democratic form of government. The right which implements that
policy, therefore, should be recognized as being derived from a more
fundamental source than a statute. It is submitted that Congress
in writing the review statutes, and the judiciary in interpreting them,
have been, in effect, applying constitutional theory to the "fourth
branch" of government. The checks on agency power provided by
legislative limitation of duties, executive appointment of officers, and
judicial review of actions, should be complemented by participation
of interested parties in decision making. Perhaps the next step in
the development traced in this note will be judicial recognition of a
constitutional right to be heard in the administrative process,
founded on the first amendment. As the late Professor Meiklejohn
96-97; FRIENDLY 1293; SHAPIRo 334-39. Jaffe also expresses caution, but
argues for a "public action" open to all citizens with vigorous use of judicial
discretion to limit appeals. JAFFE 523-24. Professor Davis disagrees, and
would allow standing only to one "adversely affected in fact"; quaere
whether he would extend that concept as far as the instant cases, and whether
the general satisfaction he expresses for current review practice will continue. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATIsE §§ 23-01 (1958), 22.10
(Supp. 1965). Reich is most enthusiastic about instances of judicial aggressiveness. Particularly, he regards United Church of Christ as revolutionary,
and he praises both cases noted here. REicH 1248-55.
"1See text accompanying note 28 supra.
02359 F.2d at 1001-02; 354 F.2d at 616. For an opinion sharply critical
of efforts by the government to restrict standing, see United States v. Public
Util. Comm., 151 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 816
(1947).
"' The movement of the case law toward "audience participation" suggests a striking similarity to the aim of "participatory democracy" espoused
by "New Left" groups:
As a social system we seek the establishment of a democracy of
individual participation, governed by two central aims: that the individual share in those social decisions determining the quality and direction of his life; that society be organized to encourage independence in men and provide the media for their common participation.
STUDENTS FOR A DEMOcRATIC SOcIETY, PORT HURON STATEMENT 7 (1964).
" It has been argued that the constitution guarantees the right to court
review of arbitrary administrative action. Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUm. L. REV. 55 (1965).
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has said, that amendment is concerned, "not with a private right,
but with a public power, a governmental responsibility. 0 5
HUGH B. ROGERS, JR.

Admission to the Bar-"Good Moral Character"Constitutional Protections
Traditionally, states have been free to set up bar admission standards as rigorous or as lenient as desired.' Thus, it is permissible
to require that the applicant for admission have graduated from law
school,2 that he swear to uphold state and federal constitutions8 , and
that he does not advocate violent overthrow of the government. 4
Perhaps the most important requirement established by every state
is that the applicant have "good moral character." 5 This requirement allows the states a great deal of discretion in determining who
will be admitted to the bar since the function of this requirement is
to insure that only those who have sufficiently high moral character
are allowed to practice law.' Any determination of character is clearly a discretionary determination.' Since the state impliedly warrants
245.

" Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup.

CT. REv.

.See Note, 106 U. PA. L. Rnv. 753, 755 (1958).
'E.g., Ex parte Florida State Bar Ass'n, 148 Fla. 725, 5 So. 2d 1 (1941).
'In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
' Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (by implication). All
fifty states require the applicant to show nonadvocacy of violent overthrow
of the government. See RULES FOR ADmISSION TO THE BAR (West 38th ed.

1963).

'See RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (West 38th ed. 1963); 64
A.L.R.2d 301 (1959); Jackson, CharacterRequirements for Admission to
the Bar, 20 FoRDHAm L. REv. 305 (1951). Besides use of the term "good
moral character," courts draw analogy and support from the term "moral
turpitude," i.e., if there is "moral turpitude," there is a lack of "good moral
character." See Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses
that Justify Disbarment,24 CALIF. L. REv. 9 (1935).
' See Comment, 15 STAN. L. REv. 500, 511 (1963) to the effect that
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